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As the revenues of health insurance
companies in Slovakia increase (Table 1),
their role as effective spenders of resources
and purchasers of high quality services for
the population is becoming ever more
important. However, the current incentive
structure for health insurance companies
(HICs) does not necessarily encourage this
function. The risk adjustment* mechanism
in place is based only on age and gender; it
is coupled with a new amendment to the
Health Insurance Act which obliges HICs
to use any profits generated for health care
services and also requires them to reduce
administrative costs from 4% to 3.5% of
total annual premium payments. This
imperfect risk adjustment mechanism and
a lack of options to compensate for losses
may encourage the HICs to ‘cheat’ the
system instead of becoming more efficient
purchasers. They may ‘cream skim’ and
select healthier patients or provide poor
quality of care in order to compensate for
high cost patients.
The case for risk adjustment
Individuals require a wide variety of health
care services throughout their lifetimes,
depending on their personal characteristics
and behaviour, social, economic and
physical environment. As a result,
purchasers of health care services have to
finance a range of health care expenditures.
While for some individuals, these expendi-
tures can to some extent be planned for
(for example, patients with a chronic
condition), for others they are more
unpredictable. Therefore, in countries with
plural systems of health care service
purchasers, such as Slovakia, where
premiums are set by law and HICs are not
allowed to openly select their enrolees or
adjust their premium rates to accom-
modate for health care expenditure risks,
there may be a motivation to engage in
hidden selection to improve the health
profile of the pool of the insured. In
addition, undersupplying care to those
patients who need it, and oversupplying it
to healthier ones, or simply not treating
those cases that are expensive, are ways
that HICs can attempt to reduce high
health care expenditures.
While the evidence from Slovakia is still
scarce, there have been several instances
which suggest that HICs may have been
engaging in risk selection instead of
focusing on improvements in quality and
efficiency. These include the recent revela-
tions that individuals have been reinsured
by HICs without their knowledge, while
misleading advertisements have also been
published, including offers of products
that cannot be provided or products
clearly targeted at the healthier part of the
population.3 While not all of these activ-
ities can be directly attributed to risk
selection, some clearly aim to attract the
healthier element of the population into
their insurance pools. Moreover, anecdotal
evidence suggests that HICs may have
been involved in selection activities for one
group of patients who represent a
substantial portion of annual health expen-
ditures – people requiring renal dialysis.
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Table 1: Health care resources in Slovakia (Slovak Korunas billions)
2005 2006e 2007p 2008p 2009p 2010p
Revenues of health insurance companies 73.5 80.3 89.7 94.4 101.4 108.9
Ministry of Health (excluding the state’s
payment for its insurees)
3.0 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.6 2.6
Resources of cities, municipalities and regions 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Eurofunds 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.5 1.5 1.5
Net financial expenditures of households 19.9 21.2 21.0 22.9 24.9 27.3
Total Resources 96.9 105.3 114.4 121.9 130.9 140.9
Public resources (% of GDP) 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.1 5.1 5.1
Private resources (% of GDP) 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Total resources (% of GDP) 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3
Source: 2007–2010 General Health Policy Framework2; e: estimation, p: projection
*Risk adjustment can be defined as the use of information to calculate the expected
health expenditures of individual consumers over a fixed interval of time and set subsidies
to consumers or health plans to improve efficiency and equity (see Folland S, Goodman
AC, Stano M, 20011)
While HICs may not be able to predict
which patients will need dialysis, they may
limit access, for example by contracting
with a more limited number of dialysis
providers. Available data4 bear this out;
examination of three HICs suggests great
variation in both the number of dialysis
patients and dialysis treatment sessions
provided (Table 2).
While regulatory measures and lawsuits
against the HICs can to some extent
control such activities, it is necessary that
they be coupled with an appropriate risk
adjustment and redistribution mechanism;
one that will compensate for higher risks
while at the same time not providing
perverse incentives on cost-effectiveness
and efficiency.
Current situation in Slovakia
Slovakia has a system of mandatory social
health insurance where citizens can freely
choose from six HICs, re-register once a
year and are entitled to uniform benefits*.
The insurance premium is set out in the
law as a percentage of income to be paid
by economically active citizens, self-
payers, while the state contributes from
general taxation for the economically
inactive portion of the population.
In order to achieve a certain level of
fairness in the system Slovakia has been
developing its redistribution mechanism to
compensate HICs for the potentially
sicker and more costly patients. The risk
adjustment mechanism has undergone
numerous changes, evolving from a system
where adjustment was only by age (two
age groups) to the one implemented in
2005 where 85.5% of the premiums
collected by the HICs are redistributed
using two parameters: age (seventeen age
groups) and gender.5 The insured are
divided into age groups by gender, where
each group has a corresponding cost risk
index, adjusted on a yearly basis, according
to historical data. Thus those HICs who
have enrolled a substantially higher
number of more risky individuals, as
determined by age and gender, are
compensated by the remaining purchasers
who have a less risky pool of citizens. This
mechanism is overseen by the Health Care
Surveillance Authority.
While risk adjustment based on demo-
graphic parameters is better than no risk
adjustment at all, it does not take into
account the health status of the population.
A young male can be considered low risk
yet he could be suffering from a disease
which is extremely costly to treat. If the
HICs cannot adjust their premiums and
redistribution depends on age and gender
only, the health plans will incur substantial
predictable losses on their high-risk
members as demographic models are weak
predictors of individual expenditure and
explain only up to 5% of overall variance.1
Thus they will continue to be motivated to
select low-risk members or take other
measures, including poor quality of care or
reduced access to care for high-risk indi-
viduals, to reduce their costs.
One of the main goals of the 2007–2010
General Health Policy Framework2 is to
improve the redistribution mechanism.
The Framework proposes the estab-
lishment of (i) high risk pools which would
help to cover catastrophic costs such as
transplants or rare diseases; (ii) the
expansion of the current redistribution
mechanism by health status parameters
based on diagnosis, drugs, and presence of
chronic disease or inclusion in a disease
management program; or (iii) carve outs
where some services or diseases that HICs
are likely to select by would be managed
separately.
One proposal6 to amend the 2004 Health
Insurance Act (2004) sought the creation
of a ‘high risk pool’ which would be used
to compensate HICs for cases above a
certain threshold. This proposal seemed to
be a positive step towards establishing risk
sharing, which is an ex-post tool where
HICs are retrospectively reimbursed for
part of their costs and could to some extent
mitigate high cost individuals that the age-
gender redistribution mechanism does not
account for. Unfortunately, this proposal
has not been approved.
Conclusion and recommendations
The absence of an appropriate redistrib-
ution mechanism coupled with a
continued lack of progress on this front
should worry both policy makers and
patients. Morbidity, through the use of
diagnosis, needs to be taken into consider-
ation as a parameter for risk adjustment, or
failing this some other form of risk sharing
should be introduced**. Without this
HICs are likely to improve their “risk
selection skills” by providing lower quality
services instead of improving efficiency.
For example, they can decide not to
contract physicians who have an excellent
record of treating patients with chronic or
expensive illnesses; the underlying aim
being to reduce the number of such
patients enrolled with their company.With
the prevalence of chronic diseases in
Slovakia (for whom costs are more
predictable than acute episodes) now
becoming similar to that seen in other parts
of Europe, this is something that Slovakia
needs to worry about.
Inappropriate incentives, a lack of under-
standing of the complexities of risk
adjustment, implementation difficulties
and data weaknesses are the main areas
requiring the full attention of policy
makers. The current system does not
provide the right incentives for health care
purchasers and recent changes in the law
may have exacerbated the situation. While
getting the incentives right is not an easy
task, only once policy makers begin to
understand the technicalities surrounding
risk adjustment and its implications for
access to quality care, can the necessary
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Table 2: Relative frequencies of dialysis in Slovak health insurance companies
Health insurance company (HIC) A B C
Number of dialysis patients per 1,000 1.62 0.28 0.56
Number of dialysis sessions per 1,000 155.36 30.32 47.32
Number of dialysis sessions per N17–N19 diagnosis 19.66 3.92 7.73
Source: Sanigest Internacional, 20034
* Some insurance companies started to offer additional benefits such as screenings, home
visits, vaccinations etc. However, there continues to be almost no competition on the
basis of benefits.
** (i) Proportional risk sharing; (ii) outlier risk sharing or iii) risk sharing for high-risks.
changes be implemented. This has to go
hand in hand with a focus on improving
data quality and a gradual implementation
of the more refined risk adjustment mech-
anism. Everyone involved in data
collection and reporting needs to under-
stand how data is to be used and how it can
contribute to the better functioning of the
system.
In addition, patients should also begin to
share information on their experiences
within the health care system, especially if
in switching health plans, they have expe-
rienced problems accessing care or have
been denied care altogether,. Their inputs
are essential. Finally, providers should
clearly state to their patients if they cannot
provide appropriate care as a result of
inappropriate incentives from HICs.
Disclosing all this information would help
raise public awareness about the gravity
and importance of these issues. It would
also help encourage HICs to reduce their
risk selection activities and facilitate
demands on policy makers to implement
an appropriate, fair and viable redistrib-
ution mechanism.
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To increase access to antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs) for treating AIDS in the devel-
oping world, donor countries and multi-
lateral agencies have developed a variety of
initiatives. In 2008, the European
Commission and European countries
provided over 60% (about €1.19 billion) of
the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS,
Malaria and Tuberculosis budget. With
these sustained pledges, Global Fund
supported programmes project to treat 1.8
million HIV infected patients over a five
year period.1 To equitably access this
treatment, theWorld Health Organization
(WHO) emphasises a drug’s rational
selection and use, sustainable financing and
affordable pricing, while also maintaining
reliable health and supply systems.2 For
ARV treatment, a notable challenge has
been affordability. This is why the
promotion of local production has the
potential to address the critical issue of
ensuring sustainable ARV supply.
One of the barriers to ARV price in high
prevalence HIV/AIDS countries is the
World Trade Organization’s Agreement
on the Trade Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property (TRIPS). In exchange for
international trade liberalisation, TRIPS
requires twenty years of pharmaceutical
patent protection. This provides a market
monopoly for patent holding drug
companies and enables them to set their
prices freely. ARV prices are often out of
reach for developing and least-developed
countries. In 2000, when few generic drugs
were available, the lowest price triple
combination ARV treatment was
US$10,439 (€11,326).3
Since TRIPS took effect in 1995, interna-
tional organisations, such as Médecins
Sans Frontières (MSF), have encouraged
both developing and the least-developed
countries to exercise flexibilities in the
agreement and subsequent Doha Decla-
ration in order to increase ARV access.
Compulsory licensing authorises
government use of a patent under public
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Summary: Affordability is a key concern of European donors who finance
antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) to treat AIDS in Sub-Saharan African countries.
In country manufacture of ARV drugs could favourably affect ARV access
through increased affordability; however, generics are a volume based market,
relying on economies of scale. The ability of Sub-Saharan African countries to
reduce their prices below large-scale manufacturers in India is challenging.
Additionally, these medicines must meet WHO prequalification standards.
While the cost of second-line ARVs remains a concern, donors should focus
resources on other components ARV access, such as the supply of human
resources for health, health infrastructure and issues of sustainable financing.
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